You know, it dawned on me today (ok, it hit me like a ton of bricks) that most financial journalists don’t really know enough about their ‘beat’ to do their job adequately. Case in point…the so-called credit crisis and financial meltdown we’ve seen over the last two months. Not too many reporters have really explained the events leading up to the implosion, though they all seem to have fluttered around it on occasion. I suspect the reason is just that their understanding of the whole thing is fairly limited. That’s a problem for serious investors who rely on these guys to get meaningful and factual information.
I’m not going to beat up the authors of the two articles I read today that drove me to this conclusion. Let’s just say I’d never heard of either one of them. However, both of the outfits they worked for were very reputable… which apparently doesn’t mean much these days.
So, since nobody else seems willing or able to, I’m going to devote some time to describe what really caused the mess we’re in now. Here’s the deal though – there are actually three distinct problems we’re dealing with. Yeah, one fuels the other two, but each has their own unique cause and solution.
Since each problem requires a somewhat-lengthy explanation though, I’m going to break this down into three bog entries. I’ll attack each problem one at a time, starting today with what happened to AIG and other insurance companies.
By now you’ve probably heard the acronym ‘CDS’ batted around. That’s short for what’s called a Credit Default Swap, which is just a fancy way of describing insurance against the default of a debt obligation.
Have you ever had mortgage insurance? Most lenders require you to purchase mortgage insurance if the equity in your home is worth less than 25% of your home’s value. Ultimately you pay for it, but it’s actually designed to protect the lender if you should happen to go into default – the insurer makes those mortgage payments to the lender if you can’t. Needless to say, it’s the mortgage insurance company assuming the bulk of the risk in the relationship.
Well, credit default swaps are basically the same thing. However, it’s called a credit default swap when done to protect the issuer of what’s called a collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) or a mortgage-backed security (MBS).
You know who issues CMOs and MBSs? Mortgage lenders like Fannie and Freddie, but there are dozens of non-government entities doing the same. They’re essentially packaging up mortgage loans, and selling them to buyers looking for income, and decent returns. For all practical purposes, CMOs and MBSs act like fixed income, and trade as such.
However, to make a CMO or an MBS more attractive and less risky, those issuers will attach CDS insurance to them. If the underlying mortgage borrowers don’t pay (in part or in full), then the insurer will step up and make those payments to the owners of the CMOs or MBSs.
You know who’s one of the biggest CDS insurers around? AIG. However, that in itself still doesn’t explain why the mortgage-backed security market came unraveled. The problem largely lies in the way insurers like AIG are required to have liquid assets to cover their obligation if and when those CMOs or MBSs go into default.
See, a mortgage-backed security may hold pieces of (literally) hundreds of different mortgage loans. It’s no secret that some loans are going into default. By and large though, most borrowers are still making payments on time. That doesn’t matter right now. The current requirements are such that if the ‘quality’ of a CMO or MBS slips by just a little, then insurers like AIG are required to come up with enough cash to cover the entire face value of the CMO or MBS.
Or to say it another way, CDS insurers are being forced to act as if all the borrowers within a CMO are in default, even if only a small fraction of them are.
Well, between ARM loans, negative equity in real estate, a recession, and over-extended consumers, pretty much all CMOs and MBSs have ‘triggered’ the cash requirement for complete coverage.
The problem is, these insurance companies don’t have this kind of cash. On the other hand, they really don’t need it.
The fact of the matter is, no insurance company of any kind would be able to pay all the claims if 100% of their customer base all filed claims simultaneously. The actuaries have figured out what the ‘optimal’ insurance premiums are that controls their likely payout risk, yet keeps the insurance affordable. They’re not going to assume the worst could happen all at the same time, because it just wouldn’t.
However, CDS insurers are essentially being forced to act as if 100% of all their insured packaged mortgage debts are in default. Of course that’s not the case…most mortgage debt is still being paid.
It’s a ridiculous rule, and probably one companies like AIG never figured would be a problem. When the defaults started to pile up though, a little bad debt went a long way – in the wrong way.
It’s dumb for one reason…it assumes the worst, even though the worst is not the way things really are.
Here’s an analogy. Suppose you owe $200K on your mortgage, but can only sell your house for $150K. Your actual net liability (and potential loss) really is only the $50K difference between the two. According to the government though, you don’t get any credit for the real estate’s value. All they’re seeing is the loan liability, and they want you to put up $200K in cash as collateral.
CDS insurers are essentially going through the same thing… they’re being required to put up the cash for the entire face value of their CMOs or MBSs, but they’re getting no credit at all for the value – even if depressed - of those securities. The process is called marking-to-market, which really doesn’t fairly value the CMOs in question.
That’s why the insurance industry has been so desperate and strained lately. They need cash, and they just don’t have it handy.
A simplified explanation? Yeah, but at its core it’s a simple matter that’s been made overly-complicated by the media….or not been explained at all.
So, that’s phase one. I still want to look at the real estate implosion, and the unwillingness of banks to lend. These are separate issues though, and I’ll be covering them in a different entry.
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